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COMMENTS

ABANDONMENT OF TOXIC WASTES UNDER
SECTION 554 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The burgeoning areas of bankruptcy law and environmental law intersect when a trustee in bankruptcy attempts to
abandon real estate on which toxic wastes are located' and
thereby escape liability for any attendant clean up costs. In
this situation, courts are confronted with the competing policies underlying state and federal environmental regulations
and the statutory scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 As deindustrialization continues and increasing numbers of companies are the subject of bankruptcy proceedings, the problem is
likely to become even more pronounced. 3
The first part of this Comment will give a brief overview of
these two different areas of law and the objectives that each
attempts to achieve. The article will next examine the relevant case law and will then consider some constraints which
prevent abuse by debtors. Finally, the article will conclude
with a discussion of several alternatives.

II.

THE RELEVANT AREAS OF LAW

A.

The Bankruptcy Code

The Constitution grants Congress the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
1. The trustee can abandon property under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
2. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-9032 and in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
3. The number of bankruptcies from 1979 to 1980 increased by 55%. E. ALTMAN,
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS:

A

COMPLETE GUIDE TO PREDICTING, AVOIDING,

AND DEALING WITH BANKRUPTCY 1 (1983). In addition, "[c]orporate failure is no
longer the exclusive province of the small, undercapitalized business but occurs increasingly among the large industrial and financial corporations." Id. See also R. MORRISON,

BUSINESS

OPPORTUNITIES FROM CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES

24-26 (1985)

(discussing why the high number of bankruptcies will continue for many years).
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United States." 4 The first comprehensive bankruptcy legislation enacted by Congress was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. s A
major overhaul of the Act, undertaken by Congress during the
1970's, culminated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.6
Bankruptcy law preempts conflicting state law.7
Bankruptcy has been referred to as a "law for the benefit
,8 A fundamental
and relief of creditors and their debtors ....
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) is to enable the
debtor to be relieved of obligations and start anew. 9 At the
same time, the Code contemplates that the debtor's assets will
be conserved until distribution can be made to creditors in an
orderly manner 10 or until the debtor proposes a confirmable
plan of reorganization, depending under which chapter of Title XI the debtor is proceeding. The statutory design of the
Code further benefits creditors by ensuring that creditors
within the same class will be treated equally in recovering
claims from the debtor.11 Thus, distribution of the debtor's
assets under the Code is not premised on which creditor seeks
protection first. 2
A voluntary bankruptcy case begins when the debtor files
a petition with the bankruptcy court.' 3 Once the debtor files,
4. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 4. Although Congress' power appears to be unlim-

ited, it must not violate the fifth amendment prohibition against taking property with-

out just compensation. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982)
(citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935)).
5. Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). See generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) for a discussion of bankruptcy laws from

1789-1935.
6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).

§§ 101-9032 and

7. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. But see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("[F]ederal regulation of a field of commerce should
not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons
8. In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 494 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673).
9. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)). A debtor in liquidation who is not
an individual does not actually receive a fresh start because 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982)
does not allow debtors who are not individuals to discharge debts.
10. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930). See infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
11. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.01-.13 (15th ed. 1987).
12. Id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV

1986) governs involuntary bankruptcies.
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an entity separate from the debtor, the bankrupt estate, is created. 4 The estate consists of the debtor's property at the time
the petition is filed. 15 Generally, a trustee in bankruptcy will
16
be appointed to serve as the "representative of the estate."'
Once adjudicated bankrupt, the debtor may either liquidate or reorganize.' 7 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, 8 the nonexempt assets of the debtor are converted to cash and then
distributed to creditors. In a Chapter 11 reorganization, 19 the
debtor hopes to emerge as a going concern, and creditors will
generally be paid out of the anticipated future income of the
debtor.
B.

Environmental Regulations

It is only recently that the risks posed by hazardous wastes
have aroused public concern and prompted extensive legislation. Hazardous wastes include a frightening array of "acids
and bases, synthetic organic compounds, fuel by-products,
toxic metals, explosives, and infectious organic materials from
hospitals and scientific laboratories." 2 To exacerbate the
problem, storage facilities are often inadequate or have eroded
over time, thus allowing wastes to seep into water supplies,
soil and air. 1
Because there are so many different types of wastes, effective legislation in this area must be as broad as possible. Indeed, Congress addressed the hazardous waste problem by
enacting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
14. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1982). According to 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1982), an interim
trustee is appointed in every Chapter 7 case. However, in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, the
court decides, on motion, whether a trustee should be appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 1104
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
17. Chapter 13 is also available to individuals but will not be discussed in this article. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20. Anderson, Negotiations and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund,
1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 264-65. See generally M. KRAFr & N. VIG, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN THE 1980's: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA (1984); A. MALLOW, HAZARDOUS
WASTE REGULATIONS: AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE (1981); B. PAIGEN, HAZARDOUS
WASTE MANAGEMENT: IN WHOSE BACKYARD? (Harthill ed. 1984).

21. Anderson, supra note 20, at 265.
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1976 (RCRA)22 to regulate the handling of future generated
waste. Then in 1980, Congress recognized the need to address
the problem of waste already generated by enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).23
The RCRA allows regulatory authorities to track hazardous wastes from generation to storage. The RCRA dictates
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintain a
list of hazardous wastes24 and further provides that wastes
may only be stored at sites in compliance with EPA standards." For violations of these regulations, the RCRA authorizes civil and criminal penalties.26 The CERCLA established
a fund, commonly known as "Superfund," to pay for the clean
up of hazardous waste sites.27 In effectuating clean up of the
sites, the EPA can either order site owners to clean up the
sites28 or pay for the clean up of the property itself, using
Superfund money, and then sue the site owner for
reimbursement. 29
Both the RCRA and the CERCLA rely on the state's cooperation. The RCRA contemplates considerable state involvement. The RCRA specifically authorizes states to
22. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
23. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1982). Penalties can be quite substantial; treble damages
equal to three times the clean up costs may be requested for failure to comply with the
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1982).
27. Superfund actually refers to the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund.
42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). Superfund revenues are collected from a tax on certain petroleum and chemical manufacturers. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b) (1982). In New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985), the court stated that Congress intended for responsible parties to be strictly liable under the CERCLA, even though
there is no explicit provision stating so. See generally Murphy, The Impact of
"Superfund"and Other EnvironmentalStatutes on CommercialLending and Investment
Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133 (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). The EPA, under CERCLA, may bring an action for
emergency injunctive relief where there is evidence of an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to the public. Id.
29. The President can use Superfund monies to fund clean up action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982), and the President has authority to take action to recover the
costs of those remedial measures under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(b), 961 l(a) (1982).
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enforce its provisions 30 and, additionally, authorizes the EPA
to help develop 3 ' and provide federal funds for state programs. 32 The CERCLA, on the other hand, does not contain
provisions for state regulation, but does require states to fund
clean up in certain instances.33 Many states have passed their
own legislation, 34 and it is these state environmental regulations that usually conffict with the Code.

III.

THE GOVERNING BANKRUPTCY PROVISIONS

The Code's abandonment 35 and automatic stay 36 provisions are the two primary means 37 available to a debtor to afford relief from potential toxic waste clean up costs. After a
brief explanation of the priority system in bankruptcy, this
section of the Comment will discuss both of these provisions;
subsequent sections, however, will only focus on the Code's
abandonment provision.
A.

The PriorityScheme

In general, when an estate is distributed to creditors, certain unsecured claims are paid pursuant to a priority scheme
set forth by Congress. 38 Section 507 establishes seven different
types of claims and expenses which are prioritized for payment, with administrative expenses occupying the highest position.3 9 Claims not classified as priority claims under section
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6904(a), 6942(b) (1982).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

32. 42 U.S.C. § 6931(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (1982).

34. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT: A SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATION (1982).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
37. There may also be other provisions in the Code which would grant relief to a
toxic waste site owner. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) could
be used by a court to halt an environmental agency's efforts to force the clean up of a
site when enforcement would impose a hardship on the bankrupt estate's creditors.
This section provides that "the court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." Id.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
39. Id. An administrative expense is defined as "the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982 &
rendered after the commencement of the case ....
Supp. IV 1986).
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507 are labeled general unsecured claims and are paid after
section 507 claims are satisfied. 40
An environmental agency seeking to clean up property
containing hazardous wastes will typically proceed in one of
two ways: the agency will either bring an action against the
debtor to compel clean up, or the agency will clean up the site
itself and then seek reimbursement from the site owner. In
the latter situation, an issue arises as to what priority attaches
to the agency's claim. To increase the likelihood of recovering
its clean up costs from the bankrupt's estate, an environmental agency may argue that its claim constitutes an administrative expense. Arguably, because administrative expenses
under section 503 have been construed as being expenses incurred after the filing of the bankruptcy petition that are necessary to administer and preserve the estate for the benefit of
creditors,4 a claim against a debtor in liquidation for toxic
waste generated by the debtor's pre-petition activity cannot
appropriately be categorized as an administrative expense;
compliance with the environmental agency would deplete, not
preserve, the limited assets of the estate for other creditors.
Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the District
of Maine in In re Stevens 12 recently found an environmental
agency's claim for post-petition clean up of a pre-petition hazard to be a first priority administrative expense where the hazard in question constituted an imminent and identifiable
danger.43
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 507, 726 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
41. See In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 756 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1985),
where the court stated, "'Administrative expenses consist of all the expenses incurred
after the order for relief that are necessary to administer the estate .... '" Id. at 519
(quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
507.04[l][a] at 507-24 (15th ed. 1984)). See
also In re Armorfiite Precision, Inc., 43 Bankr. 14, 16 (D. Me. 1984), where the court
described administrative expenses as payments given to those "who either help preserve
and administer the estate ... or who assist with rehabilitation of the debtor so that all
creditors will benefit" and In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc., 65 Bankr. 521, 530 (N.D.
W. Va. 1986), where the court noted that "prepetition expenses occasioned by the
prebankruptcy debtor are not entitled to administrative priority."
42. 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
43. Id. at 783. See also In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 756 F.2d at 520
(in dicta the court recognized expenses could be prioritized as administrative expenses if
necessary "to avert imminent danger" since this reclassification would have benefited
creditors by protecting the estate from tort liability); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70

Bankr. 943, 948 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (The court stated that even if the EPA's claim arose
pre-petition, the estate could not avoid liability since CERCLA § 9607 imposes liability
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The Automatic Stay .

In general, the bankruptcy process through section 362
temporarily halts or "stays" the enforcement of claims against
the debtor that arose before the debtor filed for protection
under the Code. 44 During the pendency of the case, the
debtor is granted a "breathing spell" from its creditors, and
the creditors are assured that the assets of the debtor will not
be dissipated due to some creditors enforcing claims ahead of
others.45
Although an environmental agency would normally fall
within the ambit of the stay,4 6 a governmental agency acting
under its police or regulatory power is exempt from the stay
under section 362(b)(4).4 7 However, the Code provides an exception to the exception; a governmental unit, acting pursuant
to its police or regulatory power, will still be subject to the
automatic stay if it is seeking to enforce a money judgment
against the debtor.48
A governmental agency which attempts to compel a
debtor to clean up a hazardous waste site will invariably be
on the "owner or operator" of a facility. The court construed "owner" to include a
bankrupt estate.). But see Security Gas & Oil, Inc. v. West Virginia, 70 Bankr. 786, 795
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that "[a] duty to clean up an environmental hazard created
pre-petition is generally not one of the obligations entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code.").
44. Section 362 provides:
(a) [A] petition filed under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title ... operates as
stay.., of (1) the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case... (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case... (3) any act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to
exercise control over property of the estate ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l)-(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 340-42 (1978); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978).
46. A governmental unit is considered an "entity" for purposes of the automatic
stay. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (Supp. IV 1986).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982). This exception is consistent with the intent of
the Code to treat creditors equally. If the state agency were merely seeking to recover
money from the debtor, its claims would be no different from claims asserted by other
creditors. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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acting pursuant to its police or regulatory power4 9 and would
therefore be excepted from the automatic stay under section
362(b)(5) 5 ° But if the agency's claim against the debtor takes
the form of an injunction compelling clean up, the characterization of this injunction becomes the pivotal issue in determining whether the environmental agency will be exempt
from the automatic stay. Consequently, if a court reasons that
an agency's injunction implicitly requires the debtor to spend
money to comply with it and should therefore be regarded as
a money judgment, the agency's claim against the debtor will
fall within the purview of the automatic stay.
Indeed, recent court decisions on whether to except an
agency's clean up claim from the automatic stay have often
rested on whether the court considered the particular agency's
actions to compel clean up to be efforts to enforce a money
judgment within the meaning of section 362(b)(5).51 However, courts have not been able to agree on when an injunction
constitutes a money judgment, and as a result, decisions on
this issue have not been uniform. 2
C. Section 554 -

The Abandonment Provision

Section 554 of the Code provides: "After notice and a
hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value and benefit to the estate. ' 53 Once property is abandoned, it is effectively separated from the estate and any con-

49. Hazardous wastes are an appropriate subject of a state's police power since

these hazards threaten public health, safety, and welfare. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); Missouri v. United States
Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1984);
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1978); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52 (1978).
50. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding a state environmental
agency's injunction compelling clean up was a money judgment); Penn Terra, 733 F.2d
267 (holding a state environmental agency's injunction ordering compliance with state
laws was not a money judgment and therefore excepted from the stay).
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
52. Id. See generally Comment, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. IV 1986).
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comitant obligations to clean up the toxic wastes on the
property cannot be paid out of the bankrupt debtor's estate. 4
Section 554, unlike section 362, appears to be unequivocal
in its language and provides for no explicit exceptions that
would limit its applicability. Despite its seemingly unambiguous language, some judges believe there are exceptions inherent in section 554 and do not believe that Congress intended
for debtors to possess an absolute right of abandonment, particularly in the face of hazardous waste concerns. 5 Conversely, others have argued that section 554 should not be
construed to allow for judicial discretion to deny abandonment; instead, abandonment should be automatically granted
56
upon a showing of burdensomeness or inconsequential value.
D. The Section 554 Conflict
When a state environmental agency opposes a trustee's
motion to abandon property containing hazardous wastes, the
courts are faced with the difficult decision of having to choose
which competing policy should take precedence. If the debtor
is forced to comply with state environmental regulations, the
spirit of the Code is compromised. If abandonment is denied
and clean up of the property is ordered, the funds used to remedy the hazardous waste problem deplete the debtor's estate,
leaving less or no money available for distribution to other
creditors. Such a result is violative of the intent of the Code,
which was designed, in part, to provide some guarantee that
the estate of the debtor would be distributed in an orderly
fashion and that no one creditor would receive preferential
treatment.
Alternatively, allowing a debtor to escape liability by
abandoning real estate containing toxic wastes presents an
equally unpalatable result. Permitting debtors to pollute the
54. Kovacs, 468 U.S. at 284 n.12. But see CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982)
(imposing liability for clean up costs upon "any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
wastes were disposed of").
55. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct.
755 (1986). See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; infra notes 71-72 and accompanying
text.
57. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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environment with impunity offends basic principles of fairness; concerns for public health and safety are compelling reasons why environmental regulations should supercede the
trustee's abandonment rights under section 554. Indeed, the
plethora of state and federal toxic waste legislation evidences a

strong public policy in favor of cleaning up toxic wastes. 8
The legislative history of section 554 indicates that Congress did not contemplate how this section would operate in
the environmental context.5 9 As a result, courts have engaged

in considerable guesswork to determine what Congress would
have wanted had it foreseen the problems in this area.60

IV.
A.

THE CASE LAW

The Midlantic Decision

Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Departmentof Environmental Protection,6 1 the first case to address a trustee's
right to abandon a toxic waste site, exemplifies the conflict
between the intent of the Code and state environmental concerns. In Midlantic, Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta),
a waste oil processor, faced extensive clean up costs after the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP) discovered that Quanta had accepted over 400,000
gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a toxic carcinogen.
However, before negotiations with NJDEP were completed,
Quanta filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Code.
The NJDEP subsequently issued an administrative order re58. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
59. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Midlantic, noted the absence of helpful legislative history of § 554. See Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 764 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 916 (3d Cir. 1984), ayffd sub nom.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986)
(noting no legislative history for § 554).
60. It is interesting to note that the Code has often prevailed in conflicts with other
areas of the law. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (upholding a debtor's rejection of a collective bargaining agreement).
Another interesting issue which often arises from the conflict between the Code and
hazardous waste regulations is the determination of future claims which will be manifested in the form of injuries from toxic wastes. See generally Note, Proceduresfor
Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153
(1982); Note, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future
Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369 (1985).
61. 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
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quiring Quanta to clean up its New Jersey site. Because of its
grim financial condition, Quanta converted the action to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 and a trustee was assigned. After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, it became apparent
that Quanta had similar hazardous waste problems at its New
York facility. When the sale of the New York property
proved to be fruitless, the trustee gave notification that he intended to abandon the property pursuant to section 554(a).
After both the bankruptcy court6" and the District Court
for the District of New Jersey63 approved abandonment of the
New York site,6 the trustee gave notice of his intention to
abandon the property at the New Jersey location. 65 Abandonment of wastes at the New Jersey site was also approved by
the bankruptcy court. 6
On appeal,67 however, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower courts' decisions to permit abandonment. 8 After granting certiorari, a
divided Supreme Court affirmed the third circuit's decision
and held that abandonment is not allowed "in contravention
of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to
69
protect the public health or safety from identified hazards.
In reaching its decision to deny abandonment, the Court relied heavily on the underlying legislative intent of section 554.
The Court assumed that when Congress codified the judgemade rule of abandonment in section 554, it necessarily included the "well-recognized" common law exceptions to the
62. In re Quanta Resources Corp., No. 81-5967 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 7, 1982).
63. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 55 Bankr. 696 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1983).

64. After the New York site was abandoned, the trustee removed the guard service
and fire suppression service at the site; New York then decontaminated the site at a cost
of approximately $2.5 million. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 758.
65. The property abandoned at the New Jersey site consisted primarily of the contaminated oil. Id. The Midlantic Court noted that "[t]he trustee was not required to

take even relatively minor steps to reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing,
drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive
agents." Id. at 758 n.3.
66. In re Quanta Resources Corp., No. 81-5967 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 17, 1983).
67. Because the abandonment of both the New York and New Jersey facilities
presented the same issues, the parties involved in the litigation surrounding the New
Jersey site consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit under 11 U.S.C. § 405(c)(1)(B) (1982).
68. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), afl'd sub nom.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
69. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 762.
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rule, namely that a trustee's power of abandonment cannot
abrogate certain state and federal laws.70
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
language of section 554 is clear and without exception in
granting a trustee the right to abandon property. 71 Rehnquist
similarly relied on the legislative history of section 554, but
unlike the majority, found that it does not "suggest that Congress intended to limit the trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property where abandonment might be opposed by
those charged with the exercise of state police or regulatory
powers."

72

B.

The Midlantic Paradox

On its face, the Court's decision to deny abandonment in
Midlantic appears to be a well-intentioned one, with concerns
of public health and safety prevailing over the Code. Yet, the
import of the decision leaves unanswered an issue of critical
importance; that is, even when abandonment of toxic waste
property is disallowed, who should ultimately pay for the
clean up?73
A paradox created by Midlantic surfaces in two different
contexts: first, when a debtor files for liquidation under Chapter 7 but has no cash, and second, when a debtor files for
bankruptcy but has cash from the liquidation of non-toxic assets. Under the controlling analysis of Midlantic, the trustee
of an estate with no cash in a Chapter 7 liquidation will not be
permitted to abandon property containing hazardous waste
until he makes the necessary expenditures to bring the property into compliance with governing state regulations; 74 but he
is precluded from complying if the debtor's estate has no
70. Id. at 759-60. Section 554 was an attempt to codify the common law rule of
abandonment for the first time. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 554.01 (15th ed.

1987).
71. Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 763-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 764.

73. The Court stated, "New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as
an administrative expense. That question, however, like the question of the ultimate

disposition of the property, is not before us." Midlantic, 106 S.Ct. at 758 n.2. When
the case was before the Third Circuit on appeal, Justice Gibbons described the majority,
in not addressing from which "pocket" the clean up costs would come, as being "irresponsible." Quanta, 739 F.2d at 925 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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money. Indeed, this lack of money is often the very reason
why the debtor initially sought protection under the Code.
Conceivably, the trustee in this situation could find himself
amidst a bankruptcy with no resolution.
Similarly, a debtor who has filed for Chapter 7 liquidation
but has cash from the liquidation of non-toxic assets presents
a problematic scenario. Because Midlantic did not address the
priority of payment issue,75 the state agency, according to
many courts, 76 will occupy the position of a general unsecured
creditor, and as such, will follow last behind other creditors in
the distribution of the debtor's estate. Thus, in these circumstances, the state agency can successfully oppose a trustee's
motion to abandon property, but has an unlikely chance of
ever having its claim paid because of its low priority in the
distribution of the estate. It is important to note that even if
the state agency's claim for clean up costs were to be elevated
to the level of an administrative expense, thereby entitling it to
payment ahead of other creditors, the debtor's available cash
for distribution to other creditors would be drained; the creditors of the estate would then bear a disproportionate burden of
remedying a public problem. In this situation, one creditor, a
state agency, would have received preferential treatment in recovering from the debtor - a result clearly not contemplated
by the Code.7
A debtor filing a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization and
emerging as a going concern, presents the only scenario where
adherence to the Midlantic decision is actually a workable solution and does not pose much of a policy conflict. Here, because the debtor is continuing in business, the costs of clean
up can appropriately be considered an administrative expense.
This treatment of clean up costs would not offend section 503,
since it is anticipated that the debtor will expend funds in the
ordinary course of business.
Thus, under a strict reading of Midlantic, once a trustee's
motion to abandon property with hazardous waste is denied,
it is virtually impossible to state with any certainty how the
ultimate resolution of the bankruptcy will be accomplished
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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since Midlantic never addressed who should pay for clean up.
The next section, however, will examine how a trustee moving
for abandonment of hazardous waste property is likely to fare
based on cases following Midlantic.
C. Post-Midlantic Cases
The cases following Midlantic stand for the proposition
that abandonment will be permitted, even where state environmental laws are violated, when the debtor cooperates with
state environmental agencies and takes reasonable steps to
prevent any immediate harm to the public.
In In re Oklahoma Refining Co. ,78 the Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma was presented with a
factual situation similar to that of Midlantic.7 9 In Oklahoma
Refining, the trustee was seeking to abandon real estate surrounding the bankrupt estate's oil refinery. Sixty-five years of
refining crude oil at this site resulted in extensive surface contamination. Efforts to sell the property, as in Midlantic, were
unsuccessful and the only cash the trustee had was cash collateral, which section 363(c)(2)(A) prohibited him from using. 0 The Oklahoma Water Resources Board and the
Oklahoma State Department of Health, concerned about potential groundwater contamination, opposed any move by the
trustee to abandon the property and argued that the trustee
should use cash collateral to comply with state clean up laws.
The court noted the "formidable dilemma" of the trustee
and stated that strict compliance with state environmental
laws, pursuant to Midlantic, could "create a bankruptcy case
in perpetuity and fetter the estate to a situation without
resolve." 8 '

78. 63 Bankr. 562 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
79. The court stated, "Unquestionably this case is similar to Midlantic and we are
only called upon to apply that holding." Id. at 562.

80. Section 363(c)(2)(A) provides: "The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash
collateral ...

unless ...

consents .

" i.I U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A) (1982). In Oklahoma Refining, the creditors

each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral assets

with an interest in the cash collateral objected to its use as clean up funds. Oklahoma

Refining, 63 Bankr. at 564.
81. Oklahoma Refining, 63 Bankr. at 565.
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The bankruptcy court escaped the Midlantic quandry by
assigning it a narrow reading. 2 The court decided that the
Supreme Court did not intend to create such a "predicament"
and instead intended for courts, in determining whether to
permit abandonment, to merely take state environmental laws
and regulations into consideration. The bankruptcy court further interpreted the Midlantic decision as requiring a determination of whether abandonment would present an "immediate
and menacing" threat to public health and safety.8 3 After deciding that the debtor had been fairly cooperative with the
state environmental agency and that pollution at the site did
not present an immediate and menacing harm, the court per84
mitted abandonment.
Like the Oklahoma Refining court, the Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Minnesota in In re FranklinSignal
Corp.85 interpreted Midlantic as requiring something less from
the trustee seeking to abandon toxic waste property than strict
compliance with applicable state laws. In resolving the dispute between the trustee and the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources, the Franklin Signal court indicated that
the Midlantic court was not attempting to bar abandonment
in every situation where state laws were violated. Rather, the
court was concerned with merely limiting a trustee's power of
abandonment to ensure that necessary measures would be
trustee to adequately protect the public health
taken by the
86
and safety.
Like the Oklahoma Refining court, the Franklin Signal
court promoted a less restrictive interpretation of Midlantic.
However, the FranklinSignal court set forth the following five
factors which should be considered by a bankruptcy court in
determining whether to permit the abandonment of a hazard82. In Midlantic, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that it was only recognizing a narrow exception to a trustee's power of abandonment. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at
762 n.9. The court in Oklahoma Refining noted this language, which helped it escape
the difficulties of having to follow a strict construction of Midlantic. Oklahoma Refining, 63 Bankr. at 565.
83. Oklahoma Refining, 63 Bankr. at 565.
84. Id. The court noted that abandonment in this case "will not aggravate the

existing situation, create a genuine emergency nor increase the likelihood of disaster or
intensification of polluting agents." Id.
85. 65 Bankr. 268 (D. Minn. 1986).
86. Id. at 271.
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ous waste site: (1) the imminence of danger to the public
health and safety; (2) the extent of probable harm; (3) the
amount and type of hazardous waste; (4) the cost to bring the
property into compliance with environmental laws; and (5)
the amount and type of funds available for clean up. 87 The
Franklin Signal court went on to say that at a minimum,
Midlantic would require the trustee to conduct an investigation of the hazardous wastes on the property and to give notice to the appropriate state and federal agencies. 88
Finally, another case interpreting Midlantic, In re Pierce
Coal & Construction, Inc. 89 is consistent with the other postMidlantic cases in limiting the trustee's power to abandon
property only in situations where imminent and identifiable
harm is present.
Based on recent case law following the Midlantic decision,
it appears that a court, in considering whether to permit abandonment of a toxic waste site, will not be constrained to automatically deny abandonment where state laws are violated, as
Midlantic would seem to suggest. Instead, recent case law indicates that a court will examine the particular facts of each
case, with weight given to any reasonable steps taken by the
debtor to minimize the hazard and the general willingness of
the debtor to cooperate with the appropriate agencies. The
trustee's right to abandon property seems to be completely
barred only where the threat of imminent harm exists. Therefore, the cases following Midlantic have escaped its deficiencies by recognizing only a narrow exception to the trustee's
power of abandonment.
V.

A.

CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEBTOR

Bad Faith Use of Section 554

Because there are provisions of the Code which provide a
debtor with the means to avoid hazardous waste clean up, will
87. Id. at 272.
88. Id. at 273. It is interesting to note that the court considered section 144.76(6)
of the Wisconsin Statutes, which authorizes the use of state funds to clean up certain
hazardous waste spills. Id. at 272 n.7. The Franklin court stated, "Apparently, the
State of Wisconsin has anticipated that in certain instances the public will be responsible

for hazardous waste cleanup." Id.
89. 65 Bankr. 521 (N.D. W. Va. 1986).
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debtors use the Code in bad faith to shield themselves from
liability? This particular question has been answered affirmatively by many commentators who believe such abuse to be
rampant.90 Indeed, although the United States Code requires
"good faith" for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, 91
the remainder of the Code is devoid of any good faith requirements forfiling for bankruptcy. However, there are sufficient
impediments, both within and without the Code, to prevent
such flagrant abuse. 92 It is important to note that there are
undoubtedly debtors facing potentially ruinous clean up costs
who perceive bankruptcy to be their only viable option. In
this situation, although toxic waste liability may have been the
motivating force propelling the debtor into bankruptcy, the
decision to file is not necessarily one made in bad faith.
Alternatively, where a debtor contemplating bankruptcy is
motivated by a bad faith purpose, the general undesirability of
bankruptcy serves as one disincentive to the debtor to file. In
addition to the stigma of declaring bankruptcy, the debtor is
likely to incur tremendous costs during the administration of
the bankruptcy that otherwise would not have been
incurred.

93

90. See Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1985); Note, Cleaning up in
Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the FederalBankruptcy Code by IndustrialPolluters,85
COLUM. L. REV. 870 (1985).
91. Section 1129(a)(3) of the Code provides, in part: "The court shall confirm a
plan only if ... [t]he plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. VI 1986).
92. See generally ALTMAN, supra note 3. Altman found that of all the bankruptcies he studied in 1980, ninety-four percent of the companies were identified as having
lack of experience or incompetence as the primary contributing factor of the bankruptcy, and only 0.5 percent were in bankruptcy because of fraud. Id. at 40.
93. See P. NELSON, CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS: BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS FOR
BANKRUPTCY POLICY (1981). Nelson states:
When bankruptcy is triggered when it is not needed, firms are subjected to an
environment that they would not have otherwise experienced. Clearly, bankruptcy brings administrative costs that would not have been incurred otherwise.
To the extent that these administrative costs make adjustment in bankruptcy
more costly and less productive than informal adjustment, social losses result.
Id. at 22. See also Comment, Developments In The Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
HARv. L. REV. 1462, 1585 n.71 (1986) (discussing why bankruptcy is not in the best
interest of a solvent corporation since shareholders are ranked last in the priority of
distribution).
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Moreover, certain provisions within the Code, namely sections 305,94 707,95 and 1112,96 should allay fears that debtors
will use the Code solely to circumvent environmental regulations. All three of these provisions give the bankruptcy court
considerable discretion to dismiss a debtor's petition for bankruptcy. Both section 707 and section 1112 allow a bankruptcy
court to dismiss "for cause,"' 97 while section 305(a) requires
that dismissal by a court serve the best interests of the debtor
and the creditors. 98 These provisions have been invoked by
the courts in several recent decisions to prevent debtors from
flouting state environmental laws by filing for bankruptcy.
For example, in In re Martin,99 the court found that three
solvent debtors filed for bankruptcy primarily to "escape the
financial consequences of their alleged conduct of polluting
the environment . . . ."I" The court dismissed the debtors'
petitions for bankruptcy, pursuant to section 1112(b) of the
Code, and indicated in its decision that bankruptcy cannot be
used "for the sole purpose of frustrating a legitimate process
of a non-bankruptcy forum." '°1
On the other hand, it would be more difficult for a creditor
to base a motion to dismiss upon section 305(b) since this section dictates that dismissal by the court must be predicated on
a finding that the best interests of the debtor and the creditor
would be served. 102 In re Commercial Oil Service, Inc. 103 dem94. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1982).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (Supp. III 1985) provides: "The court may dismiss a case
under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for cause ..... I1 U.S.C.

§ 1112(b) (1982) provides:
[O]n request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may
convert a case under this chapter to a case under Chapter 7 of this title or may

dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of creditors
and the estate, for cause ....
98. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1982) provides: "The court, after notice and a hearing,
may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this

title, at any time if-

(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served

by such dismissal or suspension . ..."

99. 51 Bankr. 490 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
100. Id. at 495.
101. Id. (citing In re Winn, 43 Bankr. 25 (M.D. Fla. 1984) and Furness v.
Lilienfield, 35 Bankr. 1006 (D.Md. 1983)).

102. See supra note 98.
103. 58 Bankr. 311 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
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onstrates how difficult it is for a creditor to prove to the court
that dismissal will be in the best interests of the debtor, particularly when the debtor voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. In
refusing to dismiss the debtor's petition for bankruptcy where
the debtor had voluntarily filed, the court in Commercial Oil
noted that "it defies credulity to say that the Debtor's interest
would be better served by a dismisal [sic] when the Debtor
voluntarily sought the mechanics of Chapter 11 for the purpose of rehabilitation and a fresh start."'1 4 It then applied this
reasoning to a Chapter 7 liquidation and refused to dismiss
the debtor's petition under section 305(b). Nevertheless, the
court in Commercial Oil did permit the petition to be dismissed ,under
section 707, which only requires a showing of
,105
"cause.

B.

CriminalSanctions

The imposition of criminal sanctions against debtors who
violate state environmental regulations might discourage debtors from using the Code solely to escape toxic waste liability
since criminal fines imposed by a governmental unit are nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(7).10 6 The
penalty against the debtor, however, to be nondischargeable,
cannot be "compensation for actual pecuniary loss.' 10 7 Consequently, if a state imposes a fine on the debtor merely to
recover its anticipated clean up costs, the amount is not a penalty within the meaning of section 523(a)(7), but rather is
compensation for a pecuniary loss to the state agency.
In In re Tinkham, °8 the debtor contended that a civil penalty against him for dumping toxic wastes was actually compensation to the state of New Hampshire for an actual
pecuniary loss and was therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The court noted that the penalty in question of $10,000 per
day for every day of violation actually punished the debtor,
accomplishing a fundamental purpose of a penalty, and was
104. Id. at 315 (quoting In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 16 Bankr. 750, 753

(S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
105. The court considered the health, safety and welfare of the community to be
"cause" within the meaning of § 707. Commercial Oil, 58 Bankr. at 316.

106. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
107. Id.
108.

59 Bankr. 209 (D.N.H. 1986).
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not just an attempt to reimburse the agency for future costs it
would incur in cleaning up the property."0 9 Perhaps the mere
presence of stiff criminal sanctions would encourage debtors
to comply with state environmental regulations before bankruptcy ever becomes a consideration.

VI.

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

A.

The Need for Legislation

Thus far, there has been no satisfactory resolution of the
conflict between the abandonment provision of the Code and
environmental regulations. Although it is not likely that Congress intended for the Code to shield debtors from hazardous
waste liability, the unambiguous language of section 554 indicates that a trustee is allowed to abandon property upon a
showing of burdensomeness or lack of value, regardless of any
environmental violations.110 While courts may feel compelled
to limit debtors' use of section 554 to undermine environmental regulations, 1 ' the role of the courts is not to legislate but
to enforce laws.112 Accordingly, courts, as mere enforcers of
the law, are powerless to redress this problem without a legislative response.

109. Id. at 213.
110. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 61-72.
112. The United States Bankruptcy Court in In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.,
56 Bankr. 918 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), discussed the undesirability of judicial legislation.
The court, in deciding whether a state agency's claim for clean up costs was an administrative expense, stated:
The question before this court is not whether public policy might justify the
enactment of well-considered and carefully crafted legislation affording some
type of priority treatment to environmental clean-up expenses. The question is
whether the particular expenses claimed in this proceeding come within the language and purpose of the current statute .... There are dangers to judicially

legislating here by stretching § 503(b) beyond its intended scope - among
them, the potential for unwittingly creating an incentive for governmental authorities to postpone environmental cleanup activities for financially strategic
reasons in order to gain the advantage of priority treatment in a bankruptcy
context.
Id. at 927. See also In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 50 Bankr. 790, 795 (D. Vt. 1985)
(commenting on the Quanta majority "'attempting to graft its view of proper public
policy onto the Bankruptcy Code").
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B. Amendment of Section 554
As section 554 now stands, a bankruptcy court is required
to make findings only concerning the burdensomeness and inconsequential value of the property in question. 113 One solution would be to amend section 554 to require the court to
make additional findings of whether clean up costs of the
.property in question exceed the value of the property once rehabilitated. If expending money for clean up would ultimately make the property salable for a price exceeding the
clean up costs, these costs would then be "necessary" to preserve the estate for the benefit of creditors and could then appropriately be considered first priority administrative costs
within the meaning of section 503.114 Alternatively, where the
clean up costs exceed the ultimate value of the property, abandonment should be allowed. Although the costs of this situation will be forced on the environmental agency (that is, the
public), the public, rather than creditors, can more easily absorb these costs.
However, abandonment under section 554 should also be
predicated on a finding of good faith. Such a requirement
would preclude the solvent debtor from using the abandonment provision to escape liability. A good faith requirement
embodied in section 554 comports with the overall intent of
the Code, which contemplates that good faith will be used by
debtors in filing for bankruptcy.115 It is also interesting to
note that the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
under section 1113 of the Code, a situation conceptually similar to the abandonment of property, requires a finding of good
faith. 116
Finally, section 554 could be further qualified to provide
that in no case can abandonment occur without at least minimal safety measures being taken to temporarily ensure that
public health and safety are not compromised. 117 This qualifi113. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 39.
115. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of provisions of
the Code which allow dismissal of a bankruptcy petition upon a finding of a lack of
good faith.
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
117. This requirement would prevent the situation in Midlantic from recurring. In

Midlantic, after abandonment was allowed by the lower courts, the trustee was not
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cation would codify to some extent the reasoning of Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
ProtectionI and its progeny which state that property cannot
be abandoned where there is an imminent harm.1 19
Although no solution is flawless, at least the above solutions work within the framework of the Code and limit the
situations where a debtor will completely escape responsibility
for clean up costs. Perhaps one of these alternatives, combined with other measures, such as criminal sanctions 120 and
more stringent compliance requirements, will curb the
problems in this area.12
VII.

CONCLUSION

A debtor's use of section 554 to avoid toxic waste liability
seriously undermines attempts to enforce environmental regulations. But denial of abandonment ultimately forces creditors to fund clean up and thereby contravenes the intent of the
Code. Further complicating this issue is the Supreme Court's
denial of abandonment in Midlantic, which is good public policy but unworkable in certain situations. In the wake of
Midlantic, courts have been forced to maneuver around the
Supreme Court's decision.
Amending section 554 to require additional findings, including the costs of cleaning up the property and the presence
of good faith, forces the costs of clean up on the debtor, where
required to take even minor steps to reduce the risk of fire or vandalism. Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 758 n.3 (1986).
118. 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
119. See id.; In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 272 (D. Minn. 1986); In re
Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (W.D. Okla. 1986). Some additional factors
discussed in Franklin Signal might also be incorporated into § 554. Here, the court
stated that the following should be considered when deciding whether to permit abandonment: (1) the imminence of danger to the public health and safety; (2) the extent of
probable harm; (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste; (4) the cost to bring the
property into compliance with environmental laws, and; (5) the amount and type of
funds available for clean up. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 272.
120. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
121. State superliens are commonly suggested solutions in this area. A superlien is
a lien on the liable party's property which takes priority over any prior perfected liens.
Note, The Constitutionalityof Retroactive State Superliensfor Toxic Waste Cleanup Reimbursement, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 161 (1986). However, these liens are often challenged on constitutional grounds for impairing the interests of secured creditors and
thus constituting a "taking" under the fifth amendment. Id. at 178-79.
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appropriate, and forces the cost on the public only where absolutely necessary. The amendment of section 554, combined
with other measures, would not only clarify the law for the
courts, thereby eliminating much guesswork, but would also
establish acceptable public policy without violating the intent
of the Code.
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